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Preemption Problem: Does ERISA Preempt the California Consumer 
Privacy Act?* 
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”) to ensure that when private employers establish benefit plans for 
their employees, they keep their promise to provide those benefits. This 
comprehensive regulatory scheme governs benefits administration, establishes 
plan reporting requirements, and defines fiduciary duties for those involved in 
plan administration and decision-making. But ERISA is silent on a key issue 
affecting plan participants and sponsors today—data privacy and security. 
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), enacted in 2018 and effective 
beginning January 1, 2020, represents the most comprehensive data privacy law 
in the United States. If the CCPA applies to ERISA plans, it will force plan 
sponsors and administrators to strengthen their data security protocols, 
increasing participants’ data security and consumer rights while also increasing 
plan administration costs. But whether the CCPA applies to ERISA plans 
remains an open question. 
ERISA may preempt the CCPA if a court were to find that the CCPA 
impermissibly interferes with the administration of ERISA plan benefits. If 
ERISA preempts the entire CCPA, plans would be exempted from compliance 
with generally applicable state data privacy laws that would otherwise improve 
plan security and therefore benefit plan participants. This Comment argues that 
because ERISA does not create an explicit duty for plans to reasonably safeguard 
data and the CCPA applies generally, courts should allow for provisions of the 
law that are not directly connected with employee benefits administration to 
escape preemption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As of June 2020, 401(k) retirement plans in the United States held an 
estimated $6.3 trillion in assets. 1  As work and communications become 
increasingly virtual, these retirement assets become more vulnerable to data 
breach and cyber fraud.2 In the event of a cyberattack or data breach, plan 
beneficiaries may potentially hold the plan administrators and fiduciaries liable, 
but the applicable law and the extent of its protection remains unsettled.3 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 4 
regulates employer-sponsored pension and healthcare plans. Congress passed 
ERISA to promote these plans and ensure that policyholders receive full 
benefits even if their employer becomes insolvent.5 One of ERISA’s primary 
 
 1. Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plan Research, INV. CO. INST., https://www.ici.org/ 
policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [https://perma.cc/7V2F-4TA9] (last updated Oct. 2020).  
 2. See Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, Insight: Coping with 401(k) Cyberattacks and Fraudulent Plan 
Distributions, BLOOMBERG L. (June 18, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-
benefits/insight-coping-with-401k-cyberattacks-and-fraudulent-plan-distributions [https://perma.cc/ 
UPR5-KQKK]. 
 3. See Gregg Moran, Breaches Within Breaches: The Crossroads of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibilities 
and Data Security, 73 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 485–87 (2019). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 
29 U.S.C.). 
 5. See id. § 2, 88 Stat. at 833 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)). ERISA was passed 
partly in response to large businesses failing and being unable to pay pension benefits to their 
employees because the plans were not adequately funded. Robert A. Cohen, Note, Understanding 
Preemption Removal Under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578, 588 (1997). Congress wanted to ensure 
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goals was to facilitate uniform administration of pension and healthcare plans6 
nationwide, and it contains two preemption7 provisions to achieve this goal.8 
Generally, ERISA may preempt a state law if it (1) conflicts with ERISA’s civil 
enforcement scheme9 or (2) if the state law “relates to” an ERISA plan such 
that it would interfere with the uniform administration of the plan.10 ERISA’s 
broad preemption standard allows for covered plans to avoid potential liability 
under state laws that impact the administration of the plan’s benefits; however, 
the Supreme Court’s inconsistent interpretation of the ERISA preemption 
standard makes it notoriously difficult to predict whether preemption applies 
in a given scenario. 
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, data privacy and data security 
were not issues on the national radar. At that time, the most advanced piece of 
related technology in ERISA administration was the fax machine, and plans 
mailed communications and distributed disbursements by check.11 Today, plan 
participants most frequently interact with their plans online, transmitting 
personally identifiable information (“PII”), which puts participants’ 
information at risk in the event of a data breach. 12 ERISA’s text does not 
address plan participants’ rights to a cause of action in the event of a data breach 
nor does it address participants’ data privacy rights. Although several federal 
 
that older workers who planned to receive retirement funds from pension plans would actually receive 
those funds. Id. 
 6. See § 4, 88 Stat. at 839 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)). ERISA generally covers 
any employee benefit plan that is established or maintained “by any employer engaged in commerce or 
in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or “by any employee organization or organizations 
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or 
“by both.” Id. Pension plans are plans that provide retirement income to workers, while welfare plans 
provide other benefits such as healthcare, disability, death, or unemployment benefits to workers, but 
not retirement income. Cohen, supra note 5, at 589. 
 7. Preemption occurs when a state law is displaced by a federal statute. See Caleb Nelson, 
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2000). The Supreme Court has developed a framework to 
analyze preemption. Id. at 226. A federal law may preempt state law in three ways by: (1) including a 
preemption clause expressly withdrawing power from the states (express preemption), (2) regulating 
an area so completely that it “withdraws state lawmaking power over that field” (field preemption), or 
(3) conflicting with the state law (conflict preemption). Id. at 226–29. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. For example, a plaintiff’s suit against their pension plan for failure to properly disburse 
benefits would be preempted because ERISA provides a remedy in this situation. See, e.g., Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004) (“[I]f an individual, at some point in time, could have 
brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty 
that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-
empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).”). 
 10. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 11. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 5 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/ 
sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2011-privacy-and-security-issues-
affecting-employee-benefit-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG9W-9WSN].  
 12. See id. 
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laws require financial services providers to secure PII, these laws do not directly 
apply to benefit plans or the sensitive data that these plans hold. 13 In the 
absence of a comprehensive federal consumer data privacy law,14 states have 
adopted their own data privacy legislation which has created a nationwide 
patchwork of different data privacy laws.15 
On January 1, 2020, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
(“CCPA” or the “Act”) 16  went into effect, imposing strict consumer data 
 
 13. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(1999)  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); The Fair 
Credit  Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681); and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681; 20 U.S.C. § 9701-08), all address data security for 
financial services, but do not extend to ERISA plans. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & 
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, CYBERSECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR BENEFIT PLANS 7 
(2016),  https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2016-
cybersecurity-considerations-for-benefit-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG9W-9WSN]. 
 14. The Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58), allows the Federal Trade Commission to bring enforcement actions 
against companies who engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices or fail to establish adequate 
protections of consumer data. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 
2018, at 5 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKD4-ZFGD]. However, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act does not mandate the comprehensive reporting and disclosure 
requirements that the CCPA requires and serves more as an enforcement mechanism of specific federal 
legislation, rather than a comprehensive data privacy law. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. 
Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2299 (2015) 
(making the case for the Federal Trade Commission to expand its enforcement role and take a more 
progressive stance on developing comprehensive data protection standards). 
 15. See 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 
3,  2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumer-
data-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/FSK3-T6VF]. 
 16. Ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
.199.100  (2020)). On November 3, 2020, California passed the California Privacy Rights Act 
(“CPRA”  or “Proposition 24”) by ballot initiative. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, 
Proposition  24 (Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199.100 (2020)); see F. Paul 
Pittman & Kyle Levenberg, Before the Dust Settles: The California Privacy Rights Act Ballot Initiative 
Modifies and Expands California Privacy Law, WHITE & CASE TECH. NEWSFLASH (Nov. 13, 
2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/dust-settles-california-privacy-rights-act-ballot-
initiative-modifies-and [https://perma.cc/62YF-A2U2]. The CPRA strengthens the CCPA by 
establishing the California Privacy Protection Agency, expanding consumer rights, altering the thirty-
day cure period, and implementing a variety of additional data privacy and security requirements. See 
Pittman & Levenberg, supra. Most provisions of the CPRA become operative on January 1, 2023, with 
a one-year look back period for data collected in 2022. Proposition 24 § 31. The CPRA also extended 
the CCPA’s exemption of employee data until January 1, 2023, giving employers, and consequently 
employer-sponsored ERISA plans, an additional year to comply. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1798.145(m)(1), (n)(1) (2020); see Anna Park, Zoe Argento & Philip Gordon, Substantial New Privacy 
Obligations for California Employers: The California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act Passes at the Polls, 
LITTLER INSIGHT (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/substantial-
new-privacy-obligations-california-employers-california [https://perma.cc/AJS7-2PEW]. Because the 
CCPA serves as the underlying framework for the CPRA, this Comment will refer to the CCPA when 
discussing the current state of California privacy law. 
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security and reporting requirements on covered businesses in California.17 The 
Act focuses on three core consumer privacy rights: (1) the right to know about 
the personal information a business collects and how it uses and shares the 
information, 18  (2) the right to delete personal information collected by 
businesses (with some exceptions),19 and (3) the right to opt out of the sale of 
personal information.20 Companies that do business21 in California and collect 
consumers’ personal information must comply with the Act if they: (1) have 
annual gross revenues over $25 million; (2) annually buy, receive, or share for 
commercial purposes the personal information of over 50,000 consumers;22 or 
 
 17. See Rachel Myrow, California Rings in the New Year with a New Data Privacy Law, NPR (Dec. 
30, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/30/791190150/california-rings-in-the-new-year-
with-a-new-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/5ASZ-FKRD] (describing the CCPA as “the toughest 
data privacy law in the U.S.”); cf. Mary Stone Ross, I Helped Draft California’s New Privacy Law. Here’s 
Why It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, FAST CO. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90444501/i-
helped-draft-californias-new-privacy-law-heres-why-it-doesnt-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/Z4EK 
-5RXL] (arguing that although the CCPA is the “strictest privacy law in the country,” it does not go 
far enough due to a weakened enforcement scheme). Although the CCPA is regarded as the strictest 
privacy law in the United States, it is considered less strict than the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119). Heather Kelly, California Passes Strictest Online Privacy Law in the 
Country, CNN (June 29, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-
consumer-privacy-act/index.html [https://perma.cc/A6A4-4PWH]. 
 18. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1810–11 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(a)–
(b) (2020)). 
 19. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1810 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a), (d) 
(2020)). 
 20. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1811–12 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a) 
(2020)). 
 21. The CCPA does not explicitly state what it means to “do business” in California, but the 
California Tax Code and judicial decisions regarding whether out-of-state companies need to register 
to do business in the state and whether California courts have jurisdiction over out-of-state companies 
likely answer this question. Matthew Stein & Christopher Lisy, Insight: Figuring Out if You Are ‘Doing 
Business’ in California Under the CCPA, BLOOMBERG L.: PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020, 
4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-figuring-out-if-you-are-
doing-business-in-california-under-the-ccpa [https://perma.cc/9EP2-UHN7]. The California Tax 
Code defines “doing business” as actively engaging in a transaction with the purpose of earning a profit, 
and it does not include passive investments that yield dividends. See Swart Enters. Inc. v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 670, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). If a company is not required to register with 
the California Secretary of State as a non-California company doing business in California, then it may 
not qualify as doing business in the state under the CCPA. Stein & Lisy, supra. Finally, companies that 
“purposefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities in [California]” are likely 
subject to the state courts’ jurisdiction and may qualify as doing business in the state. Boschetto v. 
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 22. Originally, the threshold was 50,000 consumers, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as 
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) (2020)), but the CPRA increased the threshold to 
100,000, operative as of January 1, 2023, see California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 14 
(Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) (2020)); Pittman & Levenberg, supra 
note 16. 
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(3) derive 50% or more of their annual revenues from selling personal 
information. 23  Because employee benefit plans collect personal information 
such as names and addresses of benefit recipients, their spouses, and their 
dependents, the CCPA would likely cover these plans if they operate in 
California and meet one of the threshold requirements.24 
Prior to and upon its passage, speculation regarding how this landmark 
privacy legislation would impact employee benefit plans abounded.25 However, 
analysis of the legal impact of this law on employers and businesses who store 
and use employee personal information, specifically employee benefit plans 
covered by ERISA, does not arrive at a conclusive answer. Commentators 
uniformly state that ERISA may preempt the CCPA, either completely or 
partially.26 Analyzing the arguments for and against ERISA preemption of the 
CCPA will allow employers and plan administrators to better understand their 
legal obligations and predict risks associated with noncompliance. As data 
privacy becomes an increasingly litigated issue, courts will need to determine 
whether ERISA imposes a duty on employers to reasonably safeguard consumer 
data or whether the issue should be left to the states, which generally craft 
stricter privacy requirements. 
Since ERISA’s enactment, courts have grappled with the expansive nature 
of its preemption clause and its implications for state tort litigation, healthcare 
 
 23. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as amended 
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (2020)) (defining businesses covered by the CCPA). 
 24. Id.; see Norbert F. Kugele, Employment Data, Employee Benefits, and the CCPA, WARNER 
NORCROSS + JUDD (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.wnj.com/Publications/Employment-Data-Employee-
Benefits-and-the-CCPA [https://perma.cc/A96H-C5AK]. 
 25. See, e.g., THEODORE P. AUGUSTINOS, LAURA L. FERGUSON & EMILY HOLPERT, CCPA 
GUIDE: DOES PERSONAL INFORMATION INCLUDE EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN 
DATA? 2 (2019), https://www.lockelord.com/-/media/privacy20190405ccpa-guide-does-personal-
informatio.pdf?la=en&hash=3F74614B42724A2AA774B514F236B9A8 [https://perma.cc/A9UY-
ZERG] (explaining that “ERISA-covered benefit plans that are not HIPAA-covered (such as 
retirement, long term disability, life and AD&D) may be able to successfully argue that personal 
information collected and used in connection with such plans are not subject to the requirements of the 
CCPA” under ERISA’s preemption jurisprudence); CCPA: Employers Should Consider Implications for 
Employee Benefit Plans, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIV. & INFO. SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/01/16/ccpa-employers-should-consider-implications-for-
employee-benefit-plans/ [https://perma.cc/PXC2-RNCF] (“In the absence of further guidance, 
however, it is not certain to what extent preemption would apply – and it is also possible that a court 
could find that ERISA preempts some aspects of the law but not others.”); Lisa Sotto, Jessica Agostinho 
& Danielle Dobrusin, Where Calif. Privacy Law and Employee Benefits Data Collide, LAW360 (Feb. 14, 
2019, 3:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1127571/where-calif-privacy-law-and-employee-
benefits-data-collide [https://perma.cc/4NJW-T2WA (dark archive)] (“In the absence of further 
guidance, however, it is not certain to what extent preemption might apply . . . .”). 
 26. See Kugele, supra note 24. Their reluctance to come down on one side of ERISA preemption 
is likely because the law is unclear and untested in this area. Id. (“For programs subject to ERISA, 
there is certainly an argument that CCPA is preempted by ERISA—but California has a history of 
challenging ERISA preemption claims, and until courts work through that issue, it’s an open 
question.”). 
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administration, employment regulation, and general regulation of welfare and 
benefits plans.27 But the question of whether state data privacy laws will be 
preempted by ERISA remains unanswered. 
This Comment addresses ERISA’s potential preemption of the CCPA in 
four parts. Part I discusses the evolution of the Supreme Court’s ERISA 
preemption doctrine to provide context on how courts may rule on this 
question. Part II examines the CCPA generally and how it could impact the 
administration of ERISA plans. Part III presents arguments for preemption of 
the CCPA. Finally, Part IV argues that a likelier outcome is ERISA preempting 
only the parts of the CCPA that directly interfere with benefits administration. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF ERISA PREEMPTION 
Over the past thirty-seven years, the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption 
jurisprudence has “play[ed] like an accordion with intermittent expansive 
interpretations and narrow interpretations.”28 This part describes (1) ERISA’s 
two methods of preemption; (2) how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
statute has changed over time, pivoting from an expansive view of preemption 
to a narrower one; and (3) ERISA preemption doctrine in the context of 
invasion of privacy and data breach litigation. 
ERISA can preempt a state law in two ways: complete preemption and 
express preemption. Complete preemption occurs when ERISA’s text provides 
for civil enforcement to the absolute exclusion of other state law remedies. If a 
plaintiff is eligible to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of ERISA,29 
which provides a method for beneficiaries to sue to recover benefits owed under 
the plan or for breach of fiduciary duty,30 then any state action is completely 
 
 27. See, e.g., Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 
(1997) (holding that California’s prevailing wage law and apprenticeship programs were not preempted 
by ERISA); De Buono v. NYSA ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (holding 
that a state tax on hospitals operated by ERISA funds was not preempted under section 514(a)); 
Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “state claims 
for invasion of privacy, negligence, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and medical privacy violations 
are not preempted”). 
 28. Sharon Reece, The Accordion Type Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption Creates Unnecessary 
Uncertainty, 88 UMKC L. REV. 115, 124 (2019). 
 29. If the plaintiff can prove that an independent legal duty exists outside of the duties imposed 
by ERISA, then section 502 may not preempt the claim. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200, 201 (2004). 
 30. Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows a beneficiary to bring a civil action to “enforce his rights under 
the . . . plan.” Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 
88 Stat. 829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). A beneficiary may also bring a 
civil action under section 502(a)(1)(B) to enforce the fiduciary duties owed to him under section 404(a) 
of the plan. Id.; see also § 404(a), 88 Stat. at 877–78 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104) (detailing 
the fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries under ERISA). 
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preempted. 31  For example, a plan participant may sue under 
section 502(a)(1)(B) if their employer refuses to provide benefits entitled to 
them under the plan.32 If the plan participant brings the claim in state court, it 
will be removed to federal court through a process known as complete 
preemption.33 
Under section 502(a)’s complete preemption standard, a “state-law cause 
of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants ERISA’s civil enforcement 
remedy conflicts with clear congressional intent to make that remedy exclusive, 
and is therefore pre-empted.”34 If a state cause of action falls under ERISA’s 
section 502 civil enforcement scheme, it is converted to a federal cause of action 
and removed to federal court.35 For example, if plan beneficiaries bring state 
claims against their ERISA-covered plan administrator for failure to use 
ordinary care in the administration of benefits, then the state claims are 
preempted by section 502, which allows beneficiaries to directly bring suits in 
federal court to recover benefits due under the plan.36 
ERISA does not specifically provide a remedy in the event of data breach 
or breach of privacy, likely because data breach as it occurs today was not a 
concern in 1974. 37  Instead, ERISA’s civil enforcement remedy deals with 
effective management and administration of benefits.38 Unless an individual 
can successfully argue that data security is a benefit as defined by ERISA and 
is covered by ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, section 502 likely does not 
apply to consumers’ data security and claims related to data breach. 
 
 31. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 201 (“If an individual . . . could have brought his claim 
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), . . . the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA 
§ 502(a)(1)(B).”). 
 32. § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 891. 
 33. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 200 (citing Beneficial Nat’l. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 
8 (2003)). 
 34. Id. at 200–01. 
 35. Id. at 209. 
 36. See id. at 212–14 (holding that the plaintiffs’ state law claims alleging lack of care when making 
healthcare benefits decisions were preempted by section 502(a) of ERISA). If a plaintiff brings a claim 
under section 502 (rather than a state law tort claim), they may only obtain denied benefits and not 
punitive damages even if they were denied benefits in bad faith or by a tortious act. See Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53–54 (1987) (“Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a 
declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator’s 
improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or beneficiary may also bring a cause of action for breach 
of fiduciary duty, and under this cause of action may seek removal of the fiduciary.”). 
 37. ERISA does not explicitly require fiduciaries to protect against data breach, but it does 
establish a general duty for the fiduciary to “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(A), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)). Fiduciaries may face personal liability for any plan losses 
resulting from a breach of duty. See id. § 409(a), 88 Stat. at 886 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)). 
 38. See id. § 502, 88 Stat. at 891–93 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132).  
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The second and most debated method of ERISA preemption, express 
preemption, is located in section 514(a). Section 514(a) of ERISA explicitly 
preempts all state laws “insofar as they may . . . relate to an employee benefit 
plan.”39 ERISA does not define the meaning of relates to but does exclude 
several areas of state law from preemption, including state banking, securities, 
and insurance laws, as well as “generally applicable criminal laws.”40 Due to the 
lack of explicit statutory guidance regarding the scope of what relates to 
employee benefit plans, express preemption has been applied inconsistently. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Application of Section 514 Express 
Preemption Perpetuates Uncertainty in This Area 
ERISA section 514(a) preempts state laws that relate to an ERISA-
covered employee benefit plan. 41  Although Congress intended for this 
preemption clause to apply broadly, 42  the Supreme Court has limited the 
breadth of relate to preemption, reasoning that “[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to 
extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical 
purposes pre-emption would never run its course.” 43  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has further defined the boundaries of relates to as when the 
state’s law “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where 
the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”44 A state law 
may also relate to ERISA plans if it has an “impermissible connection with” the 
plan such that the law impacts a “central matter of plan administration.” 45 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption jurisprudence considers 
both the interaction between the potentially preempted state law and the 
ERISA plan, as well as the state law’s impact on the ERISA plan. 
The Supreme Court first addressed section 514(a) ERISA preemption in 
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 46  In Shaw, the plaintiffs challenged ERISA 
preemption of New York’s Human Rights Law. 47  The state law required 
 
 39. Id.§ 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 
 40. Id. § 514(b), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)). 
 41. Id. § 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 
 42. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (discussing the need for a broad 
preemption standard to promote “uniformity with respect to interstate plans” and to prevent “the 
possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action”); see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (discussing how the Court has applied ERISA preemption to “ensure 
that ERISA’s express pre-emption clause receives the broad scope Congress intended while avoiding 
the clause’s susceptibility to limitless application”). 
 43. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 
(1995). 
 44. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). 
 45. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). 
 46. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 47. Id. at 92. 
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employers to pay benefits to employees who were unable to work due to 
pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities.48 Delta argued that because its 
benefits plans were covered by ERISA, ERISA preempted the state law.49 The 
Court held that any state law relates to a benefit plan if it “has a connection 
with or reference to” a plan. 50 Under this broad interpretation of ERISA’s 
“plain language,” the Court held that the Human Rights Law and New York 
Benefits Law related to the ERISA plan and were consequently preempted.51 
Although this decision allowed employers to potentially avoid compliance with 
the state law, the Court explicitly stated that states could require employers to 
structure their pregnancy and disability benefits within a separate, non-ERISA 
structure to avoid preemption.52 
After Shaw, most state laws that referenced or impacted ERISA, even 
tangentially, were preempted because of this connection.53 Twelve years later, 
however, the Supreme Court backtracked and restricted ERISA’s broad 
preemptive power. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans 
v. Travelers Insurance Co.,54 the Court altered its ERISA preemption doctrine, 
rejecting “uncritical literalism” for a narrower interpretation of the statute.55 In 
Travelers, a New York law required hospitals to collect surcharges from 
commercial insurers, but not from patients insured under a Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plan. 56 The Court held that ERISA did not preempt the state law, 
reasoning that a state law that exerts an “indirect economic influence” on a plan 
does not necessarily trigger preemption under ERISA.57 The New York law 
created cost differences between the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and other 
plans, but it did not impact the choices that plans made when administering 
 
 48. Id. at 88. 
 49. Id. at 92. 
 50. Id. at 96–97. 
 51. Id. at 97. 
 52. Id. at 108 (“If the State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan comports with the requirements 
of its disability insurance law, it may compel the employer to maintain a separate plan that does 
comply.”). After Shaw, state laws such as tort laws that applied to group benefit policies and anti-
subrogation statutes that applied to self-funded medical plans were found to be preempted because 
they referenced or had a connection with ERISA. Edward A. Zelinsky, ERISA Preemption After 
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: Completing the Retrenchment of Shaw, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 
30 4 (2017). 
 53. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66 (1990) (holding that a Pennsylvania law 
precluding ERISA plans from exercising subrogation rights on a plan beneficiary’s tort recovery was 
preempted under section 514); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1990) 
(holding that section 514 clearly preempted a state common law claim that an employee was unlawfully 
discharged due to his employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the ERISA 
plan). 
 54. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 55. Id. at 656. 
 56. Id. at 649. 
 57. Id. 
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benefits.58 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that rate differences between 
plans are common without state action and concluded that “it is unlikely that 
ERISA meant to bar such indirect economic influences under state law.”59 The 
Travelers decision restricted section 514(a)’s preemptive power over state law, 
tying preemption to statutes that relate to the core functions of the ERISA plan. 
Although the Court did not find preemption in Travelers, it cautioned that 
not all state laws that indirectly impact ERISA plans will escape preemption. 
“[I]t is possible that state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, 
economic effects as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of 
coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers . . . .”60 Thus, if the state 
law impacts the benefits provided or participants covered, then it is likely 
preempted. Travelers refined ERISA preemption doctrine by focusing on the 
state law’s impact on benefits provided by the plan and its administration, 
specifically concentrating on the core objective of ERISA—ensuring uniform 
administration of benefit plans—rather than any external factor that may 
impact the plan. 
In Travelers, the Court altered the ERISA preemption doctrine without 
overruling its previous decisions. While narrowing the preemptive scope of 
section 514(a), the Travelers decision also created more uncertainty in the law 
because it upheld the previous Shaw line of cases while “simultaneous[ly] 
repudiat[ing] . . . the expansive reading of [section] 514(a) upon which that line 
is based.”61 
Following the Travelers decision, the Court struggled to reconcile its 
decision with the broader interpretation of section 514(a) preemption in Shaw. 
In holding that a California minimum wage law was not preempted by an 
ERISA-covered apprenticeship fund, the Court reaffirmed its narrower reading 
of ERISA preemption.62 Despite concurring in the result, Justice Scalia argued 
that the Court should address and overrule inconsistent prior interpretations of 
the statute to clarify the post-Travelers state of the law.63 Although the Court 
 
 58. Id. at 646. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 647. 
 61. Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA 
Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 834 (1999). 
 62. See Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) 
(“The effect of the prevailing wage statute on ERISA-covered apprenticeship programs in California 
is substantially similar to the effect of New York law on ERISA plans choosing whether to provide 
health insurance benefits in New York through the Blues, or through a commercial carrier. The 
prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans.”). 
 63. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion today because it is a fair 
description of our prior case law, and a fair application of the more recent of that case law. Today’s 
opinion is no more likely than our earlier ones, however, to bring clarity to this field—precisely because 
it does obeisance to all our prior cases, instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in some of 
them have in effect been abandoned.”). 
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has not explicitly overruled its early ERISA preemption opinions, its most 
recent decision in this area confirms a commitment to a broader interpretation 
of section 514(a) ERISA preemption. 
Most recently, the Court held that ERISA expressly preempts state 
statutes directly affecting benefits administration. In Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., 64  the Court held that a Vermont statute requiring health 
insurance benefit plans to disclose claims data to a state database was preempted 
by ERISA.65 Liberty Mutual, the ERISA plan administrator, was concerned 
that reporting claims data to the state would violate its fiduciary duty and 
instructed its third-party administrator66 not to comply with the Vermont law.67 
The Court found that “reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping are central to, 
and an essential part of, the uniform system of plan administration 
contemplated by ERISA.” 68  Moreover, state laws that govern this central 
function of ERISA plans could create “wasteful administrative costs and 
threaten to subject plans to wide-ranging liability.”69 Because a primary goal of 
ERISA is uniform plan administration, the Gobeille Court held that ERISA 
preempts state laws that prevent uniform plan administration by requiring 
national plans to report claims data to a specific state database.70 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized that states may 
request the Department of Labor (“DOL”) to provide information on ERISA 
plans to the state, which would achieve the preempted Vermont’s statute’s 
primary goal. 71  DOL has the authority to regulate plan reporting and 
administration on a federal level and to clarify how state reporting requirements 
affect ERISA plans.72 Unlike some state laws, DOL regulation of ERISA plans 
does not carry preemption risk. 
 
 64. 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
 65. Id. at 947. 
 66. ERISA imposes liability on any fiduciary under the plan. Cassandra G. Sasso, Liability 
of   Fiduciaries Under ERISA, 21 COLO. LAW. 197, 197 (1992). A person or entity is a plan fiduciary 
if  they exercise authority or control regarding the administration or maintenance of the plan’s 
assets.   Id. A third-party administrator, which is “a company that provides operational services such as 
claims processing and employee benefits management under contract to another company,” may be 
liable as a fiduciary under ERISA depending on the extent of its involvement in the plan 
administration. Julia Kagan, Third Party Administrator (TPA), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 30, 
2019),  https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/third-party-claims-administrator.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
H7DE-27Y5]. 
 67. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 942. 
 68. Id. at 945. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. The Court held that (1) recordkeeping and reporting were central to plan 
administration, and (2) allowing different states to impose different requirements on federally 
regulated ERISA plans would hinder the goal of uniform plan administration. Id. at 947. 
 71. Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 72. See id.; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 505, 
88 Stat. 829, 894 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1135). 
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B. State Law Claims for Tortious Invasion of Privacy Have Not Been Preempted 
by ERISA 
Courts have held that state tortious invasion of privacy claims against 
ERISA plans are not preempted because the state laws apply generally and do 
not directly impact the administration of benefits. For example, in Darcangelo 
v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 73  an employee sued her employer and the 
administrator of her disability benefits plan alleging violations of Maryland’s 
medical confidentiality statute and unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, 
as well as claims of invasion of privacy, negligence, and breach of contract.74 
The plaintiff alleged that the administrator, acting as an agent of Verizon (her 
employer), unlawfully obtained access to her medical records in an effort to 
provide Verizon with a justification for firing her.75 Reversing the district court 
on all but the breach of contract claim,76 the Fourth Circuit held that ERISA 
did not preempt the other state law claims because the complaint “charge[d the 
administrator] with conduct that [was] entirely unrelated to its duties under the 
ERISA plan.”77 The defendants’ conduct was so far outside of ERISA’s core 
function of plan administration that it was not acting as a fiduciary at the time 
of the alleged misconduct.78 Consequently, the claims were not related to a core 
function of ERISA because the defendants were not acting in furtherance of 
ERISA’s central goals.79 
Although Darcangelo does not specifically address invasion of privacy 
claims and ERISA, it generally holds that wrongful actions by employers and 
plan administrators that go beyond ordinary operations of the plan do not 
escape state law just because they are associated with ERISA. It is notable that, 
rather than failing to protect an employee’s privacy, the defendants in 
Darcangelo allegedly acted affirmatively to invade the employee’s privacy.80 
Similarly, in Dishman v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America,81 the Ninth 
Circuit held that tortious conduct only loosely related to plan administration is 
not preempted by ERISA.82 There, the plaintiff sued the insurance company 
 
 73. 292 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Id. at 186. 
 75. Id. 
 76. The court held that the breach of contract claim was “completely preempted and [was] 
transformed into a federal claim under ERISA [section] 502.” Id. at 187. 
 77. Id. at 186. 
 78. Id. at 192–93. 
 79. See id. 
 80. In contrast, data breach claims often allege that a defendant failed to take prudent precautions 
to secure data and protect a plan participant’s privacy. A court may be more likely to conclude that a 
plan administrator who fails to secure participants’ data is acting within the confines of ERISA plan 
administration, and consequently, a negligence claim brought by a plan fiduciary after a data breach 
would be preempted. See Moran, supra note 3, at 504. 
 81. 269 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 82. Id. at 979–80. 
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that administered his employer’s long-term disability benefits plan in an effort 
to challenge the suspension of his disability benefits and demonstrate that the 
insurer was vicariously liable for tortious invasion of privacy by its 
investigators.83 UNUM initially granted Dishman’s claim for disability benefits 
but later investigated the claim.84 Dishman alleged that an investigator retained 
by UNUM wrongfully elicited personal information about him by: (1) claiming 
to be a bank loan officer to verify information about him, (2) falsely 
representing that he had volunteered to coach a basketball team, (3) 
impersonating him to get credit card information and travel itineraries, and (4) 
repeatedly calling and photographing his residence.85 The Ninth Circuit held 
that, although “there [was] clearly some relationship between the conduct 
alleged and the administration of the plan, it is not enough of a relationship to 
warrant preemption.”86 Because the defendant’s conduct was more of a “garden-
variety” tort rather than an act of plan administration, Dishman’s state common 
law tort action was not preempted under section 514(a).87 
C. State Data Breach Laws Likely Escape ERISA Preemption 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed ERISA preemption of state 
data privacy and data breach laws.88 However, two district court cases recently 
considered whether ERISA preempts state data privacy laws. These cases 
illustrate two central questions that arise when looking at the interaction 
between state data privacy laws and ERISA. First, is data privacy, or the 
reasonable attempt to keep consumer personal information private, a benefit as 
defined by ERISA? And second, do state data privacy laws affect the uniform 
administration of ERISA plans? 
In a Ninth Circuit class action data breach case, In re Anthem, Inc. Data 
Breach Litigation,89 a California district court held that the defendants’ claims 
were neither completely nor expressly preempted by ERISA. 90  The court 
declined to extend the definition of plan benefit under ERISA to include data 
security because ERISA defines benefits as insurance-type payments or 
coverage for healthcare-related services, and thus found no section 502 complete 
 
 83. Id. at 979. 
 84. Id. at 978. 
 85. Id. at 979–80. 
 86. Id. at 984. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Although not related to data privacy, the Ninth Circuit did rule that a state law claim for 
tortious invasion of privacy was not preempted by ERISA. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
269 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that pursuing a tortious invasion of privacy action against 
plan administrators would not interfere with the uniform administration of benefits because it would 
not require administrators to “vary their administration of benefits state by state”). 
 89. No. 15-MD-02617, 2016 WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). 
 90. Id. at *48, *50. 
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preemption.91 When analyzing express preemption, the court determined that 
“laws that implicate the administration of ERISA benefits are subject to express 
preemption, and laws that do not are not preempted.”92 It reasoned that the 
state laws applicable to the plaintiffs’ argument qualified as “laws of general 
application, and do not focus exclusively (or, for that matter, even primarily) 
upon ERISA plan administration.”93 Because the plaintiffs’ state law claims94 
did not “implicate the administration of ERISA benefits,” they were not 
preempted by ERISA.95 
In In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,96 an 
Oregon district court also held ERISA does not preempt state data security 
laws.97 There, the defendant, an ERISA plan administrator, argued that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were completely preempted because they could have been 
brought under ERISA’s section 502 civil enforcement scheme.98 The Oregon 
court held that “the fact that data security protection is not a ‘benefit’ under 
ERISA is not determinative of whether complete preemption applies” 99 
because plaintiffs may sue under section 502 to “‘enforce [their] rights’ under 
the plan.”100 The plaintiffs alleged that the express terms of their plan required 
Premera to provide “reasonable and adequate data security measures,”101 and, 
because the plan discussed data security, the court held that “at least some of 
the claims . . . could have been brought under [section] 502(a).”102 Ultimately, 
the Premera court found that “although there is some relationship between data 
security and the administration of Plaintiffs’ ERISA plans, it is not enough to 
overcome the presumption against preemption of state law.”103 
These district court cases suggest that ERISA does not preempt state data 
breach laws. The state data breach laws generally apply to all companies, not 
 
 91. Id. at *48. State law claims to recover ERISA plan benefits, including healthcare costs and 
retirement plan disbursements, are completely preempted by ERISA section 502. See supra notes 29–
36 and accompanying text. 
 92. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *50. 
 93. Id. at *49. 
 94. The district court reviewed plaintiffs’ claims against Anthem under a number of state law 
claims, including one under the Georgia Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act, ch. 39, 
1982 Ga. Laws 615 (1982) (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-39-1 to -23 (LEXIS through 
the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)). In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *4. 
 95. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *50. The court also noted that invasion of privacy claims 
are not subject to ERISA preemption. Id. (citing Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 
974, 984 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 96. No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL 539578, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 97. Id. at *22. 
 98. Id. at *18. 
 99. Id. at *20. 
 100. Id. at *19 (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004)). 
 101. Id. at *20. 
 102. Id. The district court determined that, because the plaintiffs were suing to enforce terms under 
the plan, they could have brought at least some of their claims under section 502. Id. 
 103. Id. at *22. 
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just the ERISA plan administrators. Although liability for data breach would 
indirectly impact the plan’s administration of benefits through increased costs 
and risk mitigation efforts, it would not likely impact whether and how plan 
participants receive their benefits. 
D. ERISA Plan Fiduciaries May Have a Duty To Reasonably Protect Participant 
Data 
ERISA states that plan sponsors and plan administrators have a fiduciary 
duty to plan participants and may be personally liable for any losses a plan 
incurs from a data breach. 104  ERISA requires fiduciaries to discharge their 
duties “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances” 
that a “prudent man . . . familiar with such matters” would use.105 Apart from 
reports from the ERISA Advisory Council, 106  DOL has failed to issue 
conclusive regulatory guidance on plan administrators’ fiduciary duty as it 
relates to data privacy.107 
However, recent litigation in response to 401(k) cybersecurity breaches 
and distribution fraud suggests that plan sponsors and administrators may have 
a fiduciary duty when it comes to data privacy and security.108 A participant in 
Estee Lauder’s 401(k) plan sued the plan sponsor and providers alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty by failing to safeguard the plan assets against unauthorized 
distributions and failing to maintain adequate cybersecurity defenses.109 The 
complaint alleged that in September or October of 2016, an unknown person or 
persons stole $99,000 in three different unauthorized distributions from the 
plaintiff’s retirement account.110 The parties later settled the case.111 
In a similar case, Bartnett v. Abbott Laboratories,112 the plaintiff sued her 
employer (the plan sponsor) and the retirement plan administrator for breach 
of fiduciary duty and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
 
 104. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 409(a), 88 Stat. 
829, 886 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)); see also supra note 37. Plan fiduciaries include anyone who 
provides investment advice for the plan or exercises discretionary control over the plan’s operation. 
Usually these fiduciaries include plan trustees, administrators, and members of the plan’s investment 
committee. Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/ 
fiduciaryresp [https://perma.cc/V8FM-99XZ]. 
 105. § 404(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). 
 106. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 107. Moran, supra note 3, at 486. 
 108. Mamorsky, supra note 2. 
 109. Rebecca Moore, Parties in Suit About Estee Lauder 401(k) Account Data Breach Announce 
Settlement, PLANSPONSOR (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.plansponsor.com/parties-suit-estee-lauder-
401k-account-data-breach-announce-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/AEF9-MD5Z]. 
 110. Complaint (ERISA) at 4–5, Berman v. Estee Lauder Inc., No. 19-cv-06489 (N.D. Cal. filed 
Oct. 9, 2019). 
 111. Moore, supra note 109. 
 112. No. 20-CV-02127, 2020 WL 5878015 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2020). 
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Practices Act113 after an unknown third party accessed her account, changed the 
password, and stole $245,000 from the account. 114  The court held that the 
plaintiff stated a claim against the plan administrator for breach of fiduciary 
duty under ERISA and that the state law claims for deceptive trade practices 
were not preempted.115 Similarly, a Third Circuit district court held that plan 
administrators have a fiduciary duty to guard against fraudulent withdrawal 
requests from ERISA-covered retirement accounts caused by a cybersecurity 
breach.116 
Given the modern state of data security and clear frequency and danger of 
breach,117 it is almost certain that ERISA fiduciaries have a duty to take some 
data security measures. However, plans have little guidance on what is required 
by federal law. 118  As data security becomes a more pressing issue, plan 
administrators should evaluate whether their fiduciary duty to prudently invest, 
administer, and protect plan assets includes a duty to protect against data 
breach. ERISA plans often contract with a third-party administrator to 
administer benefits, and this fiduciary duty to guard participant data may 
extend to the prudent selection of service providers.119 
If ERISA’s fiduciary duty does extend to data security and a plan 
participant’s data is breached, the plan fiduciary still may not have necessarily 
breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA.120 If the fiduciary can prove that they 
took appropriate measures to guard against the breach, then they will likely not 
be found liable.121 However, there is no official guidance regarding what types 
of cybersecurity controls are appropriate and necessary in the retirement plan 
 
 113. Ch. 121 1/2, 1961 Ill. Laws 1867 (1961) (codified as amended at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 505/1 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-651)). 
 114. Bartnett, 2020 WL 5878015, at *2. 
 115. Id. at *8–9. 
 116. See Leventhal v. MandMarblestone Grp., LLC, No. 18-cv-2727, 2019 WL 1953247, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. May 1, 2019). The court also held that the plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of contract 
were preempted by ERISA because they related to the plan’s administration. Id. 
 117. Moran, supra note 3, at 490–91 (“[A]t least on some level, data breaches are unavoidable. Data 
thieves have the time, money, and tools to attack businesses relentlessly—in fact, hackers released 
around 357 million new variations of malicious programs in 2016 alone. . . . Under these circumstances, 
it is no wonder that so many high profile targets have suffered data breaches, including federal agencies 
such as the State Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and even the National Security Agency.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 118. Id. at 486–87. 
 119. See Caroline E. Nelson, Participant Data and Fiduciary Liability: The Current Regulatory 
Environment, the Vanderbilt Lawsuit, and Best Practices for Benefit Plan Sponsors, MCGRATH N.: BLOG 
(Aug. 30, 2020), http://www.mcgrathnorth.com/employee-benefits-point-of-law/participant-data-
and-fiduciary-liability-the-current-regulatory-environment-the-vanderbilt-lawsuit-and-best-practices-
for-benefit-plan-sponsors/ [https://perma.cc/33Y9-2X5H]. 
 120. Maria P. Rasmussen, ERISA and Cybersecurity, MCGUIREWOODS (June 5, 2016), 
https://www.passwordprotectedlaw.com/2016/06/erisa-and-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/F7PA-
WERR]. 
 121. Id. 
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context.122 In a recent settlement between Vanderbilt University ERISA plans 
and their participants,123 the plaintiffs alleged that the university breached its 
fiduciary duty by allowing a third party to obtain participants’ private 
information and to profit from that access. 124 Because the case settled, the 
matter of whether PII qualifies as a plan asset and thus implicates the plan’s 
fiduciary duty remains unresolved. 
To date, DOL has not issued direct guidance on security and privacy 
requirements for participant data. 125  However, with the frequency of data 
breaches and likely post-CCPA increase in litigation concerning these 
matters,126 DOL or the courts should provide further guidance on this issue. 
II.  THE CCPA AND ERISA 
Over half of all states considered consumer data privacy bills in 2019,127 
and most states have legislation that addresses the security of private consumer 
information such as social security numbers, credit information, or other 
identifying information.128 In 2018, California passed the CCPA, which is the 
most expansive privacy legislation in the United States to date.129 The CCPA 
requires businesses to disclose how they use consumer data and clearly provide 
consumers with the option to opt out of the sale of their personal data.130 The 
 
 122. Michael Abbott & Aaron K. Tantleff, ERISA/Cybersecurity Considerations in the COVID Age, 
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/ 
2020/10/erisa-cybersecurity-considerations-covid-age [https://perma.cc/22HF-PG5M]. Plans may 
choose to apply the requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), for cybersecurity they already use for personal health information to PII 
contained in retirement plan documents. Although this is not required, it would likely provide 
sufficient evidence that the plan took appropriate data security measures. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, supra note 11, at 9. 
 123. Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
 124. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged other breaches of fiduciary duty related to the plan’s investment 
decisions and contracting with third parties. Id. 
 125. Moran, supra note 3, at 486. 
 126. David A. Zetoony & Jena M. Valdetero, 2019 Data Breach Litigation Report, BRYAN CAVE 
LEIGHTON PAISNER (May 15, 2019), https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/thought-leadership/2019-data-
breach-litigation-report.html [https://perma.cc/6RAM-5CUE]. 
 127. Rich Ehisen, Battles Still Rage over Calif. Data, Worker Classification Laws, LAW360 
(Oct.  4,  2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1198833/battles-still-rage-over-calif-data-worker-
classification-laws [https://perma.cc/AKG7-GNDD (dark archive)]. 
 128. Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NCSL (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
W2R7-JWSV]. 
 129. Max N. Helveston, Reining in Commercial Exploitation of Consumer Data, 123 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 667, 689 (2019). 
 130. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1809, 1811–12 
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.120(a) (2020)); see also Stuart D. Levi, 
California Privacy Law: What Companies Should Do To Prepare in 2019, SKADDEN (Jan. 17, 2019), 
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Act also makes it easier for individuals to sue businesses for data breach, 
providing consumers with a private right of action.131 Because general federal 
privacy regulation does not rise to the level of the CCPA,132 the Act will likely 
become a de facto national privacy law due to California’s impact on interstate 
commerce.133 
The CCPA applies to companies that do business in California and have 
more than $25 million in gross revenue, store data on over 50,000 consumers,134 
or make more than half of their revenue from selling consumer data.135 The Act 
defines a consumer as “a natural person who is a California resident”136 and 
personal information as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is 
reasonably capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked, 
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”137 However, 
the Act excludes information covered by a number of federal statutes, 138 
including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), 139  the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 140  the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act,141 or the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.142 A recent amendment to the law 




 131. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) 
(2020)). 
 132. However, some specific federal statutes, such as HIPAA or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
contain data security provisions. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019) (HIPAA Privacy Rule); id. 
§§ 164.400–.414 (HIPAA Breach Notification Rule); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Furnisher Rule). 
 133. Levi, supra note 130 (“The law effectively sets the floor for nationwide privacy protection, 
since organizations may not want to maintain two privacy frameworks — one for California residents 
and one for all other citizens.”). 
 134. See supra note 22 (explaining that this threshold will increase from 50,000 to 100,000 
consumers on January 1, 2023). 
 135. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (2020)); 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa 
[https://perma.cc/6N7E-YZ84]. 
 136. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1816 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (2020)). 
 137. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1817 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) 
(2020)). 
 138. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820–21 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c)–
(f) (2020)). 
 139. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 140. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681). 
 141. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 142. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721). 
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2023.143 However, after this yearlong grace period, the CCPA will apply to all 
employee information.144 
The CCPA outlines four basic consumer rights related to personal data: 
(1) the right to know what personal information a business has collected 
about them and how it is being used; (2) the right to “opt out” of a 
business selling their personal information; (3) the right to have a 
business delete their personal information; and (4) the right to receive 
equal service and pricing from a business, even if they exercise their 
privacy rights under the Act.145 
The CCPA imposes comprehensive reporting requirements for businesses, and 
this generally includes ERISA plans unless ERISA is found to preempt the law. 
However, the CCPA does exempt from its scope private health information 
that is covered by HIPAA.146 Therefore, most employer-sponsored health plan 
information is not subject to the CCPA. 147  Unlike the exemption for self-
funded healthcare plans, the CCPA does not exclude retirement plans covered 
by ERISA. These plans may be subject to the CCPA’s extensive reporting 
requirements, which could affect how companies and plans administer 
retirement benefits. 
The CCPA’s civil enforcement mechanism operates similarly to state data 
breach laws. 148  Although the California Attorney General is charged with 
enforcing the CCPA, the Act’s civil enforcement mechanism allows consumers 
to bring suit against businesses in the event of a data breach.149 If the business 
violates its “duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices appropriate to the nature of the information,” the affected consumer 
 
 143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 144. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 15 (Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.145(m)(4), (n)(3) (2020)). The CCPA also excludes “publicly available information,” 
which means “information that is lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government 
records.” California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1817 (codified as 
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(o)(2) (2020)). Despite this definition in the Act, the precise 
contours of what information is publicly available remains unclear. See Stuart L. Pardau, The California 
Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style Privacy Regime in the United States, 23 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 68, 93 (2018). 
 145. Pardau, supra note 144, at 72; see also § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1809–12 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.120, 1798.125 (2020)). 
 146. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c)(1) (2020)). 
 147. Sotto et al., supra note 25. 
 148. For a general discussion of whether state data breach laws may be preempted, see supra notes 
89–103 and accompanying text. 
 149. For example, the California Attorney General may pursue legal action against businesses that 
violate the Act’s reporting requirements, but consumers may not. Consumers may only pursue claims 
against entities if their data security has been compromised and only after providing the business thirty-
days’ written notice unless the action is solely for pecuniary damages resulting from the alleged 
violation. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821–22 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)–(b) 
(2020)). 
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may bring suit to recover damages “not less than one hundred dollars ($100) 
and not greater than seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750)” per consumer, 
“[i]njunctive or declaratory relief,” or “[a]ny other relief the court deems 
proper.”150 The CCPA is currently the only comprehensive state data privacy 
law that includes a private right of action for consumers. 151  However, this 
private right of action is limited to instances of data breach, 152  with the 
California Attorney General having enforcement authority over all other 
violations.153 
The CCPA could impact ERISA plans in two ways. First, the Act’s 
reporting and notification requirements could require ERISA plan providers to 
overhaul data security and compliance procedures, increasing administration 
costs. Second, plan sponsors and fiduciaries would face increased risk of 
litigation due to the civil enforcement mechanism. Companies providing 
ERISA-covered retirement plans could face increased legal compliance costs as 
well as costs associated with litigation. However, because the California 
Attorney General has discretionary enforcement of the Act,154 it is also possible 
that noncompliant plans will not be penalized. 
III.  ERISA MAY PREEMPT THE CCPA BECAUSE OF THE STATE LAW’S 
BROAD SCOPE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PLAN ADMINISTRATION 
This part will examine the likelihood of complete preemption under 
ERISA section 502 and express preemption under section 514(a). Because 
ERISA does not specifically reference data security within its civil enforcement 
scheme (section 502), a court is more likely to find that the CCPA is expressly 
preempted because of its possible interference with the uniform plan 
administration. 
 
 150. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) 
(2020)). 
 151. See Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.cc/8HYQ-LXXQ] (last 
updated Feb. 14, 2021). 
 152. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821. The private right of action would likely result in increased 
litigation against plans in the event of data breach. 
 153. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1822 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 
(2020)). 
 154. See John Stephens, California Consumer Privacy Act, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201
902/fa_9/ [https://perma.cc/E75B-MBDA]. On January 1, 2023, the California Attorney General will 
no longer enforce the Act; rather, the Act will be enforced in administrative proceedings brought by 
the California Privacy Protection Agency. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 17 
(Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 (2020)). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021) 
810 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
A. ERISA Likely Does Not Completely Preempt the CCPA and Other State Data 
Privacy Laws Because Data Privacy Is Not a Plan Benefit 
Under section 502(a) of ERISA, a “participant or beneficiary” may bring 
a civil action to recover plan benefits or enforce their rights under the plan.155 
If a plaintiff brings an action to “recover benefits due,” “enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan,” or to “clarify his rights to future benefits,” the plaintiff 
must bring the action under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision in federal 
court. 156 State law claims that could be brought under section 502 when no 
independent legal duty exists are consequently preempted, and the state court 
must remove the action to federal court.157 For example, a plaintiff’s breach of 
contract action to recover pension benefits owed to them would be preempted 
because section 502 of ERISA provides an enforcement scheme, and no 
independent legal duty is implicated outside of providing the benefits. 
When plaintiffs bring claims to recover actual monetary benefits owed 
under a plan, it is fairly evident that section 502 will supplant the state law.158 
However, the preemption and removal decision becomes less clear when a 
plaintiff sues to “enforce his rights under . . . the plan.” Taken at its broadest, 
this phrase could extend beyond rights to benefits promised by the plan and 
thus be interpreted to include a beneficiary’s right to privacy of their personal 
information.159 Preemption in this case hinges on whether the statute covers 
only a beneficiary’s right to retain benefits or if it defines rights more broadly 
to include the right to security of one’s personal data. Although circuit courts 
have not yet determined whether data security qualifies as a benefit under 
ERISA, several district courts have addressed the issue. In In re Anthem, Inc. 
Data Breach Litigation, 160 the court determined that data security was not a 
benefit under the plan, so plaintiffs’ claims were not completely preempted.161 
The In re: Premera court also held that data security was not an ERISA plan 
benefit, but it found that the plaintiffs’ rights under the plan had been breached 
because the plan expressly stated the plan’s duty to protect participants’ 
 
 155. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a), 88 Stat. 
829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). 
 156. Id. § 502(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)). 
 157. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s 
claim must be brought exclusively as a federal cause of action because the claim fell under the civil 
enforcement provision of ERISA). 
 158. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–57 (1987) (holding that ERISA’s civil 
enforcement scheme preempted the plaintiff’s state cause of action for improper benefits claims 
processing). 
 159. See In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL 
539578, at *20 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 160. No. 15-MD-026170, 2016 WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). 
 161. Id. at *47–48. 
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privacy.162 However, the court ultimately held that the state law imposed an 
independent legal duty apart from the ERISA plan such that complete 
preemption did not apply.163 
It is likely that a court would not find the CCPA’s private right of action 
completely preempted by ERISA. ERISA’s limited definition of benefits does 
not explicitly include data security and instead focuses on members’ rights in 
relation to the administration of those benefits. Thus, unless specifically 
included in plan documents, plan participants likely do not have a right to data 
security under the plan.164 When Congress passed ERISA, it did not address 
consumers’ rights related to privacy and data security.165 Congress intended to 
pass a scheme of comprehensive legislation to protect the benefit expectations 
of workers while promoting the growth of these pension plans,166 but Congress 
almost certainly did not intend for ERISA to regulate data privacy as well. 
Although ERISA does not address data security and privacy, it does 
impose a fiduciary duty on plans and their administrators.167 ERISA requires 
plan fiduciaries to act “with care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use.”168 The issue here is whether allowing a 
data breach to occur or inadvertently disclosing members’ personal information 
would constitute breach of fiduciary duty such that plaintiffs could seek 
damages under section 502. 
If a court determines that protecting against data breach falls within the 
ERISA fiduciary duty, then state data breach claims would be completely 
preempted. If plaintiffs successfully allege breach of fiduciary duty, they must 
also successfully argue that there was an injury-in-fact. 169 With the current 
 
 162. In re: Premera, 2017 WL 539578, at *20–22 (finding that, because the plan documents included 
data privacy provisions, at least some of the plaintiffs’ claims could have been brought under 
section 502(a) “to enforce their alleged rights under their ERISA plan”). 
 163. Id. at *22 (“Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an independent legal duty separate from the 
ERISA plan that has been implicated by Premera’s alleged actions. Thus, complete preemption under 
ERISA does not apply.”). 
 164. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 165. Moran, supra note 3, at 498. 
 166. Cohen, supra note 5, at 589. 
 167. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404, 88 Stat. 
829, 877–78 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104); see also supra note 104. 
 168. § 404(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). 
 169. John Utz, Privacy Risks for Non-Health Benefit Plans, LAW360 (July 2, 2018, 1:09 
PM),  https://www.law360.com/articles/1055852/privacy-risks-for-non-health-employee-benefit-plans 
[https://perma.cc/4643-X99P (dark archive)] (“To sue in federal court the participant must have an 
injury-in-fact within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, and must also have suffered 
an  injury to have recourse under ERISA.”). The Supreme Court has held that to establish standing 
in  federal court a plaintiff must prove that they experienced a “concrete and particularized” 
injury.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504  U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). A “bare procedural [statutory] violation” without the risk of real harm 
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frequency of data breach, plaintiffs could have a difficult time proving that the 
fiduciary’s irresponsible management or failure to act was the proximate cause 
of the injury and that the breach of personal information could not have just as 
likely been caused by a non-ERISA entity.170 
It is possible that a court would find complete preemption of a claim for 
damages caused by data breach, but not likely. Courts have generally 
interpreted the ERISA fiduciary duty narrowly, focusing on prudent 
investment of pension plans and administration of benefits.171 A court would 
more likely determine preemption based on ERISA’s section 514 express 
preemption provision because the CCPA imposes an independent legal duty on 
plans to guard against data breach and respond to privacy threats.172 
B. Whether ERISA Section 514(a) Expressly Preempts the CCPA Depends on 
How Broadly a Court Interprets “Relates to” 
ERISA section 514(a) preempts state laws that relate to any ERISA 
plan.173 A law relates to an ERISA plan (1) if it explicitly references the plan174 
or (2) if the state law has an “impermissible ‘connection with’” the plan such 
that it “‘governs . . . a central matter of plan administration’ or ‘interferes with 
 
does  not satisfy the concreteness requirement. Id. at 1550. Courts look to history and 
congressional  intent to determine whether an injury—tangible or intangible—occurred, and 
the  individual plaintiff must have personally suffered the injury. Id. at 1548–49. Plaintiffs meet the 
standing requirement when they actually experience identity theft resulting from a data breach; 
however, circuits differ on whether an alleged risk of future harm from data breach is substantial enough 
to meet the Article III standing requirement. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 
2017); see also Nancy R. Thomas, No Injury, No Data Breach Claims? Depends on the Circuit, 
MORRISONFOERSTER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200917-no-data-
breach-claims.html [https://perma.cc/9ZJX-BBWX] (discussing how the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits have found that the alleged risk of future harm meets Article III standing and the Third, 
Fourth, and Eighth have found that it does not). 
 170. Utz, supra note 169. Because data breaches are common and affect so many people, it is hard 
for plaintiffs to prove that the loss of their personal information was caused by a breach at a specific 
company. See Nicole Hong, For Consumers, Injury Is Hard To Prove in Data-Breach Cases, WALL ST. J. 
(June 26, 2016, 8:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-consumers-injury-is-hard-to-prove-in-
data-breach-cases-1466985988 [https://perma.cc/A4CN-UAGA] (“Companies say having personal 
data compromised doesn’t necessarily equate to an injury that merits compensation. Even when real 
harm occurs, such as when stolen credit-card information is used for fraudulent purchases, customers 
often struggle to prove that the fraud stemmed from a breach at one particular company. What’s more, 
banks typically reimburse their customers for fraudulent charges.”).  
 171. See, e.g., In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017 
WL 539578, at *21–22 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 172. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1821–22 
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (2020)). 
 173. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 
 174. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1992) (“ERISA 
pre-empts any state law that refers to . . . covered benefit plans . . . .”). 
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nationally uniform plan administration.’”175 For example, the Supreme Court 
held that a Vermont law requiring ERISA health benefit plans to report claims 
data to a state database was preempted because the law’s requirements were 
impermissibly connected to ERISA such that compliance would burden plan 
administration.176 
The CCPA exempts some entities covered by federal law from 
compliance,177 but it does not exempt ERISA-covered nonhealthcare plans, such 
as employee benefit plans. Because the CCPA does not explicitly reference 
ERISA, preemption hinges on whether there is an impermissible connection 
between the state law and ERISA that governs a central matter of plan 
administration or interferes with nationally uniform plan administration. 
Courts must consider whether data security and privacy constitute a 
“central matter of plan administration.” 178  Although data security measures 
have become ubiquitous if not mandatory, ERISA’s central matters concern the 
regulation of welfare benefits and retirement income for plan participants.179 
Moreover, ERISA does not reference data security or privacy within its text.180 
Proponents of preemption may argue that the nature of personal information 
collected by plans and the extensive reporting requirements within ERISA 
indicate that data privacy has become a central matter of plan administration.181 
Additionally, a court could find that the reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements imposed by the CCPA are a central part of plan administration 
and thus expressly preempted by ERISA.182 Overall, preemption hinges on 
whether the CCPA imposes “direct regulation of a fundamental ERISA 
function” that would impact the uniform administration of the plan.183 ERISA 
plans will likely argue that collecting and maintaining participant data is an 
essential part of plan administration because it directly impacts the plan’s ability 
to provide benefits to its participants. When a pension plan must follow a 
different set of regulations for its California participants, there is an argument 
 
 175. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 
ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)). 
 176. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 177. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820–21 (codified as 
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145 (2020)). 
 178. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 
(2001)). 
 179. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 589. 
 180. See Moran, supra note 3, at 498. 
 181. In fact, some ERISA-covered retirement plans share consumer data to promote other 
financial  products. See John Manganaro, Vanderbilt Settlement Agreement Prohibits Data-Based Cross 
Selling, PLANADVISER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/vanderbilt-settlement-
agreement-prohibits-data-based-cross-selling/ [https://perma.cc/5FGD-DJMD]. 
 182. Most recently, the Supreme Court held that a Vermont state law requiring healthcare plans 
to submit claims records to a state database “enter[ed] a fundamental area of ERISA regulation” and 
was thus preempted. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946. 
 183. Id. 
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that the regulations directly impact the uniform administration of benefits and 
thus the CCPA relates to ERISA. 
If ERISA does preempt the CCPA, the lack of regulation of ERISA-
member PII will likely persist unless ERISA is amended to include specific data 
privacy regulations or Congress enacts a national privacy law. Without further 
guidance from DOL or the courts, plans may choose to comply with the CCPA 
rather than risk the consequences of noncompliance. 
IV.  THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION 
When evaluating the ERISA preemption question, the Supreme Court 
has instructed that courts begin with a presumption against preemption because 
ERISA was not intended to replace all state laws. 184 Following the Court’s 
analysis in Gobeille, preemption hinges on two questions. First, does the state 
law act immediately or exclusively upon the ERISA plan?185 Second, does the 
act govern a central matter of plan administration or interfere with a nationally 
uniform system of administration?186 At the same time, the Court has held that 
ERISA does not preempt state laws of general applicability.187 Thus, if a court 
finds that ERISA does not preempt the CCPA, it will likely focus on the 
general applicability of the CCPA and on ERISA’s silence regarding data 
security.188 
This part discusses reasons why the CCPA may escape preemption and 
determines that partial preemption of the CCPA’s reporting and disclosure 
requirements is the most likely outcome. 
A. Obligations Imposed by the CCPA May Extend Beyond ERISA’s Fiduciary 
Duty 
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid preemption must first overcome the section 502 
complete preemption hurdle before arguing against express preemption under 
section 514(a).189 Under section 502, a plan participant may bring suit to recover 
benefits promised under the plan.190 The district court in In re Anthem concluded 
that section 502 civil enforcement rights only pertain to a plaintiff’s rights to 
 
 184. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997). 
 185. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814–15; Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham 
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997). 
 188. See In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:15-MD-2633, 2017 
WL 539578, at *20–22 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617, 
2016 WL 3029783, at *49 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). 
 189. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 190. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 
Stat. 829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). 
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retain benefits under the plan.191 The court then discussed whether protecting 
customer PII qualifies as an ERISA benefit. 192  Although ERISA does not 
define “benefit,” subsections consistently refer to benefits as payments for 
healthcare-related services or payments sent to beneficiaries.193 As such, courts 
have generally construed benefits narrowly.194 Even a medical reimbursement 
claim was not considered a benefit under section 502 complete preemption 
when the claim related to the ERISA plan or when section 502 could provide a 
similar remedy.195 Ultimately, the court stressed “the importance of construing 
ERISA benefits in a narrow manner,” and because ERISA is silent on privacy 
obligations, the court declined to extend complete preemption.196 
In In re: Premera, the district court extended complete preemption despite 
acknowledging that data privacy is not a benefit as defined by ERISA. 197 
Because Congress did not include the term benefit in the second type of 
section 502 claims (to enforce rights under the plan) but did include benefit in 
the first and third claim types,198 the court reasoned that Congress intended for 
rights to extend beyond plan benefits. 199  Thus, the complete preemption 
question partially hinged on whether the plan included “data security 
promises.”200 If the plan did include data security promises and the plan failed 
to uphold those promises, then claims to enforce those rights under the plan 
could have been brought under section 502.201 
Although the In re: Premera court found some of the plaintiffs’ claims 
completely preempted, the plan’s independent legal duty to “reasonably and 
adequately” protect participants’ data prevented complete preemption over all 
claims.202 Because the plan sponsor had a duty to protect participants’ PII under 
 
 191. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *47. (“To put it another way, ERISA complete preemption 
applies where ERISA benefits are at issue, and does not apply when ERISA benefits are not at issue.”). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., id. at *47–48 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Marin Gen. Hosp. v. 
Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. at *48. 
 197. In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL 
539578, at *20 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 198. See id. at *18 (discussing a beneficiary’s ability “to enforce his or her rights under the plan” 
without reference to a benefit in the second type of claim available under section 502). 
 199. See id. at *18–19 (“The Court’s interpretation that the second type of claim does not solely 
involve rights to ‘benefits’ is also supported by the Supreme Court’s description of the types of claims 
under section 502(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court noted that ‘[i]f a participant or beneficiary believes 
that benefits promised to him under the terms of the plan are not provided, he can bring suit seeking 
provision of those benefits. A participant or beneficiary can also bring suit generically to “enforce his 
rights” under the plan, or to clarify any of his rights to future benefits.’” (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004))). 
 200. Id. at *20. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *20–22. 
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state law, HIPAA, and industry standards, the plaintiffs’ claims were not solely 
based on the plan’s fiduciary duty under ERISA.203 
B. The CCPA’s General Applicability May Save It from Preemption 
The strongest argument against express preemption of the CCPA is the 
Act’s general applicability to businesses throughout California. It “function[s] 
irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan” and consequently should not be 
preempted.204 Opponents of preemption may argue that the goals of the CCPA 
fall within the traditional state police power to regulate businesses in the 
interest of consumers and thus should not be preempted. 
Generally applicable state laws may impact ERISA plans, but that does 
not necessarily mean that ERISA preempts them. When evaluating whether 
ERISA preempted a California state tax law, 205 the Second Circuit further 
discussed the types of generally applicable laws that have not been preempted 
including: 
(1) a generally applicable garnishment law under which creditors may 
garnish ERISA welfare benefits; (2) a law requiring companies to make 
lump-sum severance payments when closing a plant; (3) a law 
prescribing the amount that hospitals can charge for care; and (4) a city 
income tax of general application that affects employee contributions to 
benefit plans.206 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit thus distinguished between state 
laws that may impact ERISA plans and laws that control ERISA plan 
decisions—with only the latter triggering preemption.207 
The Supreme Court addressed state regulation of healthcare in Travelers, 
noting that reading all state laws that impact the costs of healthcare plans as 
preempted would displace state law and contradict the intent of the statute.208 
The consumer privacy regulation within the CCPA, like healthcare regulation, 
may impact the cost of retirement plans, but it also generally applies to all 
 
 203. Id. at *21. 
 204. Id. at *22 (arguing that the state law is not preempted because the existence of an ERISA plan 
is not essential for the state law to operate). 
 205. Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that California’s 
unrelated business taxable income exemption system was not preempted by ERISA because “taxation 
is a realm of historic state control” and does not have an impermissible “connection with” an ERISA 
plan even though the law “may have an indirect effect on [investment] choices”). 
 206. Id. at 430–31. 
 207. Id. at 431. 
 208. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
661 (1995) (“Indeed, to read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and 
charges on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that purchase insurance policies or 
HMO memberships that would cover such services would effectively read the limiting language in 
§ 514(a) out of the statute, a conclusion that would violate basic principles of statutory 
interpretation . . . .”). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021) 
2021] PREEMPTION PROBLEM 817 
California residents and large businesses transacting in California.209 Allowing 
preemption in this case would invalidate a state law regulating an area in which 
federal legislation remains silent. Moreover, allowing ERISA plans to sidestep 
state data privacy laws could put participants’ benefits at risk, which is contrary 
to the statute’s intent.210 
C. A Likely Outcome: Partial Preemption 
If faced with the ERISA preemption question regarding the CCPA, courts 
may look to the functional aspects of the state law to determine whether a part 
of the Act relates to an ERISA plan. A court will likely rule that aspects of the 
CCPA directly affecting the ERISA plan’s reporting, disclosure, and benefits-
administration functions are preempted, but general CCPA provisions dealing 
with consumer rights and privacy are not preempted. For example, the CCPA 
grants consumers the right to request specific information that businesses 
collect about them. 211  This consumer right is not afforded to ERISA plan 
participants specifically, so it likely would not be preempted because it generally 
applies to all consumers and does not relate to a central function of an ERISA 
plan. Nonetheless, ERISA may preempt the CCPA’s requirement that 
businesses disclose the type of information they collect to consumers because it 
conflicts with a central reporting function associated with the administration of 
the plan.212 
The CCPA’s private right of action for data breach will likely not be 
preempted if a court finds that guarding against data breach constitutes an 
“independent legal duty”213 apart from ERISA’s fiduciary duty. Recent Ninth 
Circuit litigation214 supports existence of an independent legal duty. But it is 
important to note that allowing consumers to sue ERISA plans or their 
fiduciaries in response to data breach does not necessarily mean that plans will 
ultimately be held responsible. If plan fiduciaries establish that they were not 
negligent because they implemented reasonable procedures to guard against the 
data breach, then they will not be held responsible. The possibility that ERISA 
does not preempt the CCPA may spur plan sponsors and administrators to 
 
 209. See Sara H. Jodka, California’s Data Privacy Law: What It Is and How To Comply (A Step-by-
Step Guide), DICKINSON WRIGHT (July 2018), https://www.dickinson-wright.com/news-
alerts/californias-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/82KD-LEH8]. 
 210. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 211. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1810–11 (codified 
as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(a) (2020)); Jodka, supra note 209. 
 212. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016) (“[R]eporting, disclosure, 
and recordkeeping are central to, and an essential part of, the uniform system of plan administration 
contemplated by ERISA.”). Note that Gobeille refers to disclosure to the state rather than disclosure to 
individuals. Id. at 939. This may impact the preemption analysis here. 
 213. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004). 
 214. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
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strengthen their cybersecurity protocols, which would guard them against tort 
liability and better protect consumers. 
Allowing the private right of action to escape preemption may increase 
litigation against ERISA plan sponsors and administrators, but it will also 
prompt ERISA plans to improve their data security protocols. Plaintiffs 
bringing data breach claims face an uphill battle when trying to prove their 
claims. 215  “[C]ircuits are split over whether individuals suffer a sufficiently 
concrete injury and therefore have standing to sue a business that suffered a 
breach when the individual’s sole injury is mere loss of data resulting from the 
breach.”216 If a plaintiff does meet the standing requirement, they must then 
prove that the business negligently handled the data and that the business’s 
negligence caused the breach.217 The CCPA’s statutory private right of action 
will likely result in an increase in costly litigation regardless of whether the 
plaintiff prevails. However, litigation risk may incentivize plan sponsors and 
administrators to improve their cybersecurity protocols. Absent amendments to 
ERISA or additional federal regulation, applying the CCPA’s private right of 
action to ERISA plans is one of the only ways to hold plans accountable for 
maintaining adequate data security. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of consumer privacy laws on ERISA plans remains uncertain 
within the legal landscape of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. ERISA’s 
silence regarding plans’ and plan administrators’ responsibilities within this 
realm leaves the area ripe for judicial interpretation. Because ERISA does not 
create an explicit duty for plans to reasonably safeguard data, and the CCPA 
applies generally, courts should allow for provisions of the law that are not 
directly connected to employee benefits administration to escape preemption. 
This will undoubtedly impose additional administrative burdens on plans, but 
allowing ERISA plans to avoid such regulation provides them with an unfair 
“free pass” from regulation that is not benefits focused. If California intended 
for ERISA plans to avoid CCPA compliance, it would have included them in 
the legislative carve out. When deciding if ERISA preempts the CCPA, courts 
should adhere to the traditional “presumption against preemption” and preempt 
only aspects of the CCPA that relate to its core objective of uniform 
administration of plan benefits. 
 
 215. See Moran, supra note 3, at 494. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. at 494–95. Proving causation becomes increasingly difficult because of the ubiquity of 
data theft and breach caused by unknown sources. Id. 
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